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Protections for Juveniles in SelfIncriminating Legal Contexts,
Developmentally Considered
Thomas Grisso

M

their behaviors in police interrogations. And here too a developmental perspective leads us to some considerations that
seem not to have been recognized by courts when shaping law
and policy for juvenile transfer proceedings.

y comments use a developmental perspective on adolescents’ capacities as a way to supplement the conclusions of three previous articles in this volume
(Tepfer, Nirider and Drizin;1 Frumkin;2 and Heilbrun et al.3)
that discuss policies to protect juveniles in legal contexts in
which they are asked to make self-incriminating statements.
The Tepfer and Frumkin articles provide ample reason for
concern about adolescents’ responses to police interrogation.
They argue adolescents are at greater risk of making false confessions (as they are more susceptible to police interrogation
strategies) and are more likely to waive their rights due to poor
understanding or acquiescence. Tepfer and his coauthors point
out that we have entered an era of juvenile justice reform that
recognizes that “adolescents are different,” a perspective that
has received special emphasis by the U.S. Supreme Court in
several recent cases.4 Age, the Court says, must be taken into
consideration when weighing the validity of a confession.5
Frumkin describes some of the things that mental health
examiners can do to assist courts in weighing youths’ capacities and vulnerability—especially their suggestibility—in individual cases that challenge confessions. Both articles refer
broadly to differences between adolescents and adults. My
comments add some complexities that arise when we go
beyond these differences to address diversity among young
people across the adolescent age span. This leads me to suggest
some refinements in our thinking about the types of protections needed for juveniles in police interrogations.
In a very different legal context, Heilbrun and his coauthors
focus on practice in many states that allows pretrial transfer
evaluations to include examiners’ discussions with juveniles
about their involvement in their alleged offenses. The presumed value of talking about the alleged offense is to determine whether the youth has empathy or remorse, which is relevant for judging whether the young person can be rehabilitated or, if not, should be tried and potentially sentenced as an
adult. This may seem like an entirely different context than
police interrogation. Yet when viewed from a developmental
perspective, as I will do later, we encounter some of the same
concerns about youths’ capacities that arise in discussions of

Adolescents are different from adults because they are still
undergoing development in several areas that influence comprehension and decision making. The evidence comes from
neuroscience regarding adolescent brain development as well
as from behavioral studies of adolescents’ functioning on tasks
that demonstrate comprehension and decision making. The
evidence can be summarized as follows.6
In general, several abilities continue to develop and improve
throughout adolescence that might make a difference in teens’
capacities in legal contexts. These include: (a) basic knowledge
of the world, including the risks associated with various decisions; (b) the ability to handle abstract concepts (like the
meaning of a “right”); (c) the ability to delay impulses by stopping to think about consequences before deciding (for example, about whether to admit or deny involvement in an alleged
offense); (d) using judgment that weighs long-term positive or
negative consequences, not just short-term gains; and (e) a
developing sense of independent autonomy and identity associated with making decisions that are not merely acquiescent
or oppositional responses to peers or authority figures. Readers of the Tepfer and Frumkin articles will see the relation
between these developing abilities and our concerns about
adolescents’ capacities to make voluntary, knowing, and intelligent decisions about their rights and their responses to police
questioning.
Recognizing that “adolescents are different from adults” in
these ways is essential when fashioning special protections for
juveniles in police interrogations. But that distinction only
takes us partway to our objective, because it focuses on adolescent–adult differences and does not consider differences
among adolescents.
Variability among adolescents in their capacities can be
framed in two ways. First, younger adolescents are far less
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capable than older ones. Improvements in ability are continuous across the six years between the 12th birthday and the
18th birthday. The risks of vulnerability due to lesser capacities are greater in the younger teen years than for the “average”
adolescent and far greater than for older adolescents.7 (We recognize this when we allow older but not younger adolescents
to obtain a driver’s license.) It is true that various fMRI studies
of adolescent brain development find that changes in areas of
the brain relevant for decision making continue well into the
20s.8 In this sense, even older adolescents have not achieved
the neurodevelopmental status of adults. Yet on tasks involving Miranda comprehension and abilities related to competence to stand trial, research typically finds little average difference in performance between 16–17 year olds and young
adults.9 The same studies find much difference between early
teens and these age groups. Thus, there is great variability in
capacities across the adolescent years because of substantial
differences on average between younger and older adolescents.
Second, variability in the capacities of adolescents that
make them generally less mature than adults is seen not only
between younger and older adolescents, but also within any
specific age. Most forensic mental health professionals who
evaluate juveniles can provide examples of some 14-year-olds
whose understanding of Miranda warnings or ability to make
reasonable decisions under stress surpassed those of some
adults, as well as examples of 18-year-olds who were more vulnerable than the average 14-year-old. Courts are right to
require attention to age when weighing young people’s capacities, because on average these change with each advancing year
until they stabilize in adulthood. Yet a youth’s age itself is an
imperfect factor for making assumptions about an individual,
because any specific age group includes young people with
capacities ranging from far below to far above the average.
In summary, “adolescence” as a period of development from
about ages 12 through 17 is a meaningful class for many purposes when thinking about needed protections in police interrogation. Yet the needs and capacities of most 12-year-olds are
quite different from those of most 17-year-olds, thus making
“juvenile” or “adolescent” a less-than-meaningful class for
some purposes. These simple developmental observations are
at the heart of challenges to our efforts to fashion protective
policies for juvenile interrogations. I will return to those challenges in a moment.
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

The Tepfer and Frumkin analyses explore complexities in
identifying youths’ capacities. Those complexities are even
greater, however, if one considers the mental disorders
among young people who are arrested and questioned by law
enforcement officers. A significant body of research10 sup-

7. THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS (1981) [hereinafter
GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER]; Thomas Grisso, Laurence Steinberg,
Jennifer Woolard, Elizabeth Cauffman, Sandra Graham, Fran Lexcen, N. Dickon Reppucci, and Robert Schwartz, Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’
Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (2003)
[hereinafter Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence].

ports the conclusion that at least
“[Vulnerabilities
60% of youth who are arrested
are far more
and enter juvenile detention centers meet standard psychiatric
likely] in the
diagnostic criteria for one or
younger teen
more mental disorders. About
years than for
40% have more than one disorder, and about 20% have serious,
the ‘average’
persistent, and chronic mental adolescent and
disorders. Symptoms of disorders
found among delinquent youths far greater than
for older
often include clinically significant anxiety (sometimes related
adolescents.”
to trauma), depression (related
to affective disorders), and
impulsiveness (especially related to ADHD). As a consequence, many young people who are questioned by law
enforcement officers are burdened not only by immature
capacities related to their level of development, but also by
symptoms of mental disorders.
Symptoms of mental disorder have two general effects that
are relevant to consider in the context of young persons’ vulnerability during police questioning. First, most of these symptoms increase a youth’s susceptibility to interrogation strategies and decrease the ability to use the already-immature
capacities that the youth might have. Second, persistent mental disorder can cause delays in an adolescent’s general development, such that the youth lags behind his or her peers both
cognitively and socially. This is another reason that age norms
for adolescent functioning are only a starting point for considering the capacities of individual young people.
IMPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTAL DIVERSITY FOR
LAW AND POLICY IN POLICE INTERROGATIONS

The diversity of abilities among younger and older adolescents—and within any specific age group—is important to
consider when we analyze our laws and policies for protecting
juveniles’ rights in police interrogations. Our mechanisms for
protection are at two levels: (a) guiding and restricting police
interrogations at the time that confessions are obtained, and
(b) judicial adjudication of cases in which claims are made that
waivers and confessions obtained in police interrogation were
invalid. The diversity of abilities among adolescents across or
within various ages is addressed by the modes of protection
provided in the latter context, but not the former.
Regarding the latter, courts’ scrutiny of the validity of confessions or waiver of rights is guided by a “totality of circumstances” test.11 This presumes that no specific characteristic of
the child and no specific interrogation behavior of law enforcement officers are determinative of the validity of waiver or the

8. For a recent review, see B. J. Casey, Rebecca Stone, and Robert
Hare, The Adolescent Brain, 1124. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 111 (2008).
9. See GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER, supra note 7.
10. For a review, see THOMAS GRISSO, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: ADOLESCENT
OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS 6–13 (2004).
11. Fare v. Michael C, 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
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voluntariness of a youth’s confession. For example, the
younger the juvenile, the more
carefully the matter of susceptibility to coercion may be scrutinized. But the mere fact that
the youth is 13 or 14 is neither
dispositive nor even presumptive regarding an answer to the
legal question. Every case must
be weighed according to the
balance of factors in the specific
case. This approach provides for individual consideration of
the wide range of developmental and psychiatric statuses of
adolescents. As Frumkin describes, many of these characteristics can be assessed by mental health professionals who can
provide such information to the court when waivers and confessions are questioned.
But regarding the first type of protective intervention, policies to guide police questioning, a “totality of circumstances”
approach is of questionable value. There are three reasons.
First, police are provided operating procedures to apply to
adolescents in general. There are exceptions in some jurisdictions; for example, some require parents’ presence when suspects are 14 or younger. But by and large police are not provided separate procedures for younger and older adolescents.
Second, judicial “totality of circumstances” opinions do not
provide meaningful guidance for police officers regarding how
to manage interrogations with adolescents of different ages. We
sometimes presume that juvenile court decisions about the
validity of youths’ confessions or waiver of rights will somehow “set precedent” that will be translated into better police
practices. Yet there is relatively little for police to learn from
judicial decisions in this arena. When each case is decided on
the “totality of circumstances,” no single factor is likely to be
highlighted in a manner that “sends a message” to police about
how to adjust their practices. For example, a 13-year-old’s vulnerability may weigh heavily in the court’s decision in one case
and be offset by other factors in another case. The multiplicity
of factors weighed in those cases creates no clear guidance
about how police officers are to translate any of the factors into
judgments about their handling of juvenile cases.
Third, even if it were clear that certain developmental or
pathological characteristics of adolescents create greater risk of
invalid waivers, this offers law enforcement officers little assistance. The circumstances of police investigations do not allow
for individual assessments, and law enforcement officers
should not be expected to “assess” youths’ developmental
capacities and mental disorders before questioning them. Such
a requirement would hold law enforcement officers accountable for employing discretion that they cannot be expected to

exercise meaningfully.
Tepfer and Frumkin offer one approach to this problem.
They refer to the value of judicial use of the best-practices
guidelines for juvenile interrogations developed by the International Association of Chiefs of Police.12 If used consistently
by judges, the guidelines might clarify some factors for police.
But will guidelines such as those offered by the IACP be adequate to deal with the diversity of capacities across the adolescent age spectrum? For example, will “limiting juvenile questioning sessions to an hour” have the same ameliorative effect
for the average 12-year-old as for a 16-year-old? Will non-leading and dispassionate interviewing do anything at all to
address younger adolescents’ vulnerability to making statements based primarily on their desire to escape the immediate
situation rather than considering longer-range consequences
of their choices?13 Will the simplified Miranda warning, “You
have the right to get help from a lawyer right now,” and the
youth’s reply, “It means I can get a lawyer right now if I want,”
have any protective value for the majority of 13-year-olds, if
they do not know the types of help a lawyer might provide?14
For purposes of fashioning protective police practices in the
interrogation of adolescents, developmental considerations do
not support the notion that “one size fits all.” There is sufficient research on the behavioral, cognitive, and functional differences between youth 14 and under and older juveniles to
require protections for younger adolescents that go beyond
those that law and policy for police interrogations might fashion for juveniles as a class. When I performed the first studies
of juveniles’ capacities to understand and waive Miranda
rights, I concluded that juveniles 14 and younger were especially poorly equipped to understand Miranda rights and to
make decisions to waive them.15 Since that time (30 years ago),
much more research has examined youths’ capacities related to
Miranda waivers and confessions16 and to abilities relevant for
competence to stand trial.17 Most of those studies have found
results consistent with my suggestion that while juveniles as a
class need special protections during interrogation, the
youngest adolescents need even more. The same project provided evidence that merely requiring the presence of parents
offered little meaningful protection. My suggestion at the
time—I was young and exuberant—was a legal requirement
that interrogation of adolescents 14 and younger should not
occur without the presence of legal counsel.
My point is not to argue for this specific protection, but to
supplement the two preceding articles by arguing the need for
a tiered perspective when fashioning policies for police practices in juvenile interrogations. Protections based on an “average” for adolescents may be insufficient for the youngest adolescents, most of whom are developmentally immature even in
relation to the average for young people seen in juvenile courts.

12. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, REDUCING RISKS:
AN EXECUTIVE’S GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE JUVENILE INTERVIEW AND INTERROGATION (2012).
13. Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence, supra note 7.
14. GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER, supra note 7.

15. Id.
16. For a recent review, see ALAN GOLDSTEIN AND NAOMI GOLDSTEIN,
EVALUATING CAPACITY TO WAIVE MIRANDA RIGHTS 54–66 (2010).
17. For a recent review, see IVAN KRUH AND THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATION OF JUVENILES’ COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL 60–74 (2009).

“[W]hile juveniles
as a class
need special
protections during
interrogation,
the youngest
adolescents need
even more.”
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Heilbrun and his coauthors reviewed laws and policies
allowing or prohibiting inquiry about the alleged offense when
mental health professionals examine a juvenile for a transfer
hearing. The authors explain that courts believe discussion of
the offense is important to learn whether the juvenile in question experiences remorse and acceptance of responsibility, suggesting better prospects for treatment in the juvenile system.
They review research on the relation of empathy and future
offending, finding some limited evidence for it. This analysis is
certainly helpful, but a developmental perspective offers additional questions.
First, as the authors of the Heilbrun article explain, affective
and cognitive empathy appear to have some relation to offending among juveniles, and the relation is a bit stronger in juveniles than in adults. They also explain that empathy involves
the ability to understand (cognitive) or feel (affective) the condition of the other person. Many of the studies they cite use
methods that assess whether the person can recognize others’
emotions. Yet if we are interested in whether empathy serves to
reduce offending, we must know whether a person can recognize others’ emotions before those emotions are displayed—
indeed, often at times before an offense when the potential victim is not yet present. “How would a hypothetical person feel
if, hypothetically, I were to do something to them?” This
“empathy in advance” requires more than recognizing and feeling another person’s emotions. It requires some level of ability
to think abstractly about people and feelings that do not yet
exist. Developmental psychology tells us that reasoning about
abstractions is one of the capacities that is developing early in
adolescence. Typically it has formed by ages 12 or 13, but for
many youth with developmental delays (due to intellectual
disability, mental disorders, or economic disadvantage), it may
still be developing well into mid-adolescence.
If the capacity for this type of “empathy in advance” is
changing (increasing) across some part of adolescence, then
what we learn about an adolescent’s empathy at a given point
in time may simply be the youth’s current level of development
regarding empathic responsiveness, not an indication of the
youth’s capacity for it in the future. We have some evidence of
the implications of this. The Heilbrun article points out that
lack of empathy has been related to measures of “callousunemotional trait,” which is one component of psychopathy.
Yet a well-constructed longitudinal research study recently
found that if we use a high score on a measure of such characteristics at age 14 to predict that the youth’s score will be high
ten years later, we will be right only 16% of the time.18 Callousunemotional trait and capacities for empathy may be more
developmentally stable when measured in older adolescents.

But in states that allow 13- and
“[A]ssessing...
14-year-olds to face transfer
empathy [of
hearings, assessing their empathy
at that age tells us their current
13- and 14empathic functioning at best, but year-olds facing
may tell us little about their
transfer to
future capacity for empathy.
Second, judging from Heilcriminal court]
brun’s description of court decimay tell us
sions on this issue, few if any
courts have been thinking about little about their
future capacity
transfer evaluations as events to
which adolescents respond
for empathy.”
according to their developmental
characteristics. They are focusing
on protecting defendants from self-incrimination in future
legal proceedings. But in the language of validity of waivers in
police interrogations, they are not thinking about the “totality
of circumstances.” Given youths’ relative immaturity—and
given the procedures employed by forensic examiners—what
are the possible threats to the reliability of the information that
will be obtained for the transfer hearing? Even with adequate
protections against the use of self-incriminating statements in
future adjudication of the offense, what are the implications
for the quality of information for purposes of the transfer hearing itself?
To examine these implications, we must talk about the context.19 There are some similarities between the transfer evaluation and the police interrogation. In both contexts, an authority figure meets with a subject in a setting in which the subject
is not free to leave (or is likely to perceive the situation in that
way). The authority figure and the subject are alone; there is no
legal counsel present.20 The authority figure gives the subject a
warning that the information can be used for some future legal
purpose. Both contexts typically involve some type of “conversation” about the subject’s life circumstances (school, home,
etc.) before discussing the offense, often designed in part to create a condition in which the subject will talk freely. Eventually
the topic of the alleged offense is raised, and the authority figure asks the subject to talk about it. With some variability, the
authority figures in both contexts may display a manner that
suggests to the subject that the reason for talking about the
alleged offense is in part to advance the subject’s own welfare.
There are also some differences between the two contexts.
Unlike the interrogation context, the juvenile is likely to have
been advised by legal counsel before the transfer evaluation.
The content of the warning in the transfer evaluation will differ from the Miranda warnings of police interrogations: for
example, that the evaluation will be used by the court to determine whether the youth will remain in juvenile court or be

18. Donald Lynam et al., Longitudinal Evidence That Psychopathy
Scores in Early Adolescence Predict Adult Psychopathy, 116 J.
ABNORM. PSYCHOL. 155 (2007).
19. My description is based primarily on experience, not on research.
Transfer evaluations by mental health professionals are one of the
least-researched types of forensic mental health assessment. The

little that has been published in this area has been reviewed in
Thomas Grisso, Clinicians’ Transfer Evaluations: How Well Can
They Assist Judicial Discretion? 71 LA. L. REV. 157–89 (2010).
20. In many states, juveniles have the right to have their attorneys
present during forensic evaluations. In my experience, attorneys
rarely choose to be present.

IMPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTAL IMMATURITY FOR
TRANSFER EVALUATIONS
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transferred to be tried as an adult; that if transferred, and if
found guilty, the youth will be subject to penalties like an
adult; that what the youth says now will not be used in that
future trial, only in the transfer hearing. In contrast to the
police interrogator, the forensic examiner will ask many more
questions about the juvenile’s general life and background to
meet the clinical purposes of the evaluation, as well as probing
much more about the juvenile’s motivations for the offense and
subsequent feelings about it.
At some point, the forensic examiner will pose the question:
“I’d like to talk to you about what happened that night in the
alley. Are you willing to do that?” And later, “How did you feel
afterwards?” Now the youth has to make some choices, many
of which are similar to those made in police interrogations:
whether to admit or deny or partially admit or deny and, in any
case, how to manage the questioning that will follow. And now
we encounter the same questions about the potential influence
of developmental immaturity on the youth’s decisions. Believing that authority figures like forensic examiners will help
them only if they confess, will they confess to things they did
not do? Fearing punishment, will they minimize their involvement in the offense in ways that are clearly contradictory to
known facts, thus causing them to appear to be avoiding
responsibility? Seeking peer approval, will they put on a
remorseless face to impress their cohorts who are similarly
charged? Being traumatized by the offense itself, will they react
as many younger adolescents do by burying their emotions so
as not to be overwhelmed by them, leading to a flat appearance
that we can easily misinterpret as a sign of lack of remorse?
There is no research to tell us whether or how frequently
young people engage in such behaviors in transfer evaluations.
But as a forensic examiner who used to do many transfer evaluations, I have seen all of these reactions and had to contend
with their meaning. Over time I learned to distrust the transfer
evaluation interview as a place to learn about young people’s
degree of remorse—just as we distrust juveniles’ confessions in
police interrogations. Observing a young person’s sadness and
apologies, or lack of them, in the complex social context of a
transfer evaluation usually told me little that I could rely on.
Much better were data obtained from situations outside the
interview: for example, in the case of one youth, the documented fact that while he was fleeing from the alley where he
had just stabbed another boy in a fight, he stopped at someone’s house to alert 911 to the injured boy’s whereabouts before
going into hiding. Any competent forensic examiner will look
outside the interview for data to arrive at meaningful inferences about remorse and empathy.
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Heilbrun and his coauthors concluded that empathy related
to the offense was only a “smaller piece of the puzzle” for
determining amenability to rehabilitation, so that allowing
inquiry about the offense during transfer evaluations is not of
great value. Similarly, my analysis suggests that courts may be
overestimating the importance of allowing inquiry about the
offense in transfer evaluations. My reasoning, however, adds to
the problem the risk of the unreliability of information gained
in that context, given the influence of developmental immaturity on juveniles’ responses to the transfer evaluation inquiry.
CONCLUSION

This brief commentary on the three preceding articles reinforces the value of “thinking developmentally” about adolescents’ responses to police interrogations and legally relevant
clinical interviews. For police interrogations, it suggests that
our future thoughts about policy and law regarding special
protections for juveniles may need to go beyond “adolescent–adult differences” to consider special protections related
to differences among adolescents themselves—younger and
older, average and disabled. For transfer evaluations, our
thinking about policy regarding inquiries into the offense to
determine remorse and empathy may need to go beyond the
question of protections against self-incrimination. We should
consider the ways in which juveniles’ developmental immaturity may seriously limit the reliability of what we can learn in
the context of our inquiry.
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